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State v. Moorman: Can Sex With a Sleeping Woman
Constitute Forcible Rape?
While a married woman was asleep in bed with her husband, the pris-
oner got into the bed and proceeded to have connection with her, she
then being asleep. When she awoke, she at first thought he was her
husband, but on hearing him speak, and seeing her husband at her
side, she flung the prisoner off, and called out to her husband, when
the prisoner ran away.
Held the prisoner was guilty of the crime of rape.1
One summer night, a college student came home from a date and went to
bed, falling asleep to the music from her radio. In the hazy period between sleep
and wakefulness she dreamed of having sexual intercourse. The dream, how-
ever, became a nightmarish reality when the woman awoke to find a man, a
slight acquaintance, flagrante delicto.2 By the end of the evening, she had not
only been assaulted vaginally, but also anally, by a man who later claimed to
have mistaken her for her roommate.
3
Can an act of sexual intercourse with a sleeping woman be grounds for a
charge of forcible rape? These facts, although bizarre,4 were the basis for a re-
cent North Carolina Court of Appeals decision. In State v. Moorman,5 defend-
ant was found guilty of engaging in acts of vaginal and anal intercourse with the
victim by force and against her will, and was convicted of second degree rape
and second degree sexual offense.6 On appeal, defendant raised the issue of
whether the State had issued a proper indictment for second degree rape.7 In
holding that a fatal variance existed "between the indictment's allegations that
the defendant carnally knew the prosecutrix by force and against her will and
the proof the State presented at trial," the court of appeals gave a new twist to
the elements of force and consent in second degree rape cases. This Note ex-
plores the development of rape law in North Carolina, examines persuasive au-
thority in other jurisdictions, and concludes that an act of sexual intercourse
1. Reg. v. Young, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 114, 114 (1878).
2. "In the very act of committing the crime." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 575 (5th ed. 1979).
3. See infra note 18.
4. Some readers may consider it beyond the realm of credibility to believe that a man could
engage in sexual intercourse with a woman before she awakens. Although rare, such occurrences
have been reported in other cases. In State v. Stroud, 362 Mo. 124, 127,240 S.W.2d 111, 112 (1951),
the Missouri Supreme Court noted that "[a]ccording to the prosecutrix, the initial penetration was
accomplished while she was asleep. This is unusual, but we cannot say it is contrary to physical
possibility." See also In re Childers, 310 P.2d 776, 777 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957) (noting that "peti-
tioner is not the originator of this method of committing rape").
5. 82 N.C. App. 594, 347 S.E.2d 857 (1986), rev'd, 358 S.E.2d 502 (1987).
6. Id. at 595, 347 S.E.2d at 858. A second degree rape conviction requires the defendant to
have engaged in an act of vaginal intercourse with the victim, while a conviction for second degree
sexual offense requires the commission of a "sexual act" other than vaginal intercourse. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-27.3, -27.5 (1986). Anal intercourse is a sexual act included within the purview of the
statute. See id. § 14-27.1(4).
7. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 598, 347 S.E.2d at 859.
8. Id.
with a sleeping person can be sufficient to meet the requirements of force and
lack of consent. It further concludes that the Moorman court, by incorrectly
defining sleeping persons as physically helpless under the North Carolina second
degree rape statute,9 set a dangerous legal precedent with disturbing ramifica-
tions for the future.
In Moorman the State's evidence showed that the victim, Patricia Noble, a
freshman at North Carolina State University, 10 had met with friends on the
evening of August 31, 1984, during which time she consumed two beers." At
approximately 1:00 a.m. on September 1, 1984, she returned to her dormitory
room, closing the door behind her. After turning her radio on to a low volume,
Noble lay down on her bed and promptly fell asleep, fully clothed. 12 Her next
memory was a dream in which she was having sexual intercourse.13 When she
awoke, she found a man astride her, who had already penetrated her vagina with
his penis and was currently engaged in the act of vaginal intercourse. 14 When
she attempted to sit up, the man grabbed her and forced her back down on the
bed, causing multiple scratches about her neck.' 5 By now fully conscious and
afraid for her life, Noble did not resist. 16 After ejaculating in her vagina, the
male engaged in anal intercourse with Noble, causing a one-half inch tear in her
rectum. 17 Noble turned on the light after the male completed these acts.
Although she recognized defendant, Noble could not recall his name.
18
The State's indictment charged defendant with first degree burglary, second
degree rape, and second degree sexual offense.1 9 The trial court found him
guilty of misdemeanor breaking or entering, second degree rape, and second de-
gree sexual offense, and entered judgments sentencing him to twelve years im-
prisonment.20 Defendant then filed a motion, which the court heard and denied,
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3 (1986). For the pertinent statutory language, see infra text
accompanying note 72.
10. Brief for the State at 19, State v. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. 594, 347 S.E.2d 857 (1986) (No.
86105C1).
11. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 597, 347 S.E.2d at 859. Although Noble consumed alcohol
during the course of the evening, she did not become intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness.
See infra note 146.





17. Id. Defendant's act of pushing Noble back down on the bed served as force sufficient to
achieve the anal intercourse. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. This showing of force did
not, however, apply to defendant's commission of the vaginal intercourse, because force in a second
degree rape case must be used to "achieve the intercourse, not to prevent its interruption." See infra
note 155.
18. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 597, 347 S.E.2d at 859. After Noble turned on the light, Moor-
man identified himself as "[Noble's] roommate's friend Percy" and told her that he had mistakenly
"thought she was the roommate, and ... would not have done what he did if he had known she was
not the roommate." Id. The court did not discuss in its opinion whether mistaken identity is a
viable defense to a charge of rape, nor whether defendant asserted such a defense.
19. Id. at 595, 347 S.E.2d at 858.
20. Id. Defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment for breaking or entering, twelve
years for second degree rape, and twelve years for second degree sexual offense, all to be served
concurrently as a youthful offender. Id.
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for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 1 Defendant
appealed both the judgments and the order.
2 2
This Note focuses on defendant's claim that the State did not present suffi-
cient evidence to support his convictions for second degree rape and second de-
gree sexual offense. The State's indictment for second degree rape alleged that
"the defendant... unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did ravish and carnally
know [the prosecutrix], by force and against her will, in violation of N.C.G.S. 14-
72.3 [sie]."'23 The indictment for second degree sexual offense charged defend-
ant with engaging in a sexual act with the victim against her will, using force
21. Id.
22. Id. Defendant's main contentions on appeal were (1) that the trial court erred by refusing
to impanel a new jury following the State's removal of all blacks from the jury through the use of
peremptory challenges, id. at 601, 347 S.E.2d at 861; (2) that he was deprived of his sixth amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel, id. at 602, 347 S.E.2d at 861; and (3) that there was
insufficient evidence to support his convictions for second degree rape and second degree sexual
offense. Id. at 596, 347 S.E.2d at 858.
The court of appeals dismissed defendant's peremptory challenge argument, holding that de-
fendant had failed "'to establish that the prosecutor had engaged in case after case in a pattern of
systematic use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the petit jury.'" Moorman, 82 N.C.
App. at 601, 347 S.E.2d at 861 (quoting State v. Jackson, 317 N.C 1, 10, 343 S.E.2d 814, 820 (1986)).
This evidentiary standard was enunciated in the United States Supreme Court decision, Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
While the Moorman case was under direct review, the Supreme Court decided Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), which effectively overruled the Swain standard. Under Batson a
defendant need only present "evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges at the defendant's trial" to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in petit
jury selection. Id. at 1722-23. The new standard merely requires defendant to show (1) that he
belongs to a racially cognizable group; (2) that the prosecutor has removed members of the defend-
ant's race from the venire through the exercise of peremptory challenges; and (3) that the relevant
circumstances give rise to an inference that the prosecutor, by using peremptory challenges, purpose-
fully excluded potential members of the venire on the basis of race. Id. at 1723. In addition, the
Supreme Court emphasized that "defendant is entitled to rely on the fact . . . that peremptory
challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind
to discriminate.'" Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held in Moorman that Batson was to be "given prospec-
tive application only to cases where the jury selection occurred after the Batson decision." Moor-
man, 82 N.C. App. at 601, 347 S.E.2d at 861. Recently, however, the Supreme Court held in
Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987), that Batson applies retroactively to all state or federal
cases "pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule
constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. at 716. Defendant, should he establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under the standard set forth in Batson, will be entitled to a new trial. See id.
Two other North Carolina cases may be affected by the Griffith ruling. See State v. Belton, 318 N.C.
141, 347 S.E.2d 755 (1986); State v. Jackson, 317 N.C. 1, 343 S.E.2d 814 (1986).
The Moorman court also rejected defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. Although the court found that defense counsel's performance was substandard in
various respects, the defendant also carried the burden of establishing "that the dlficiencies of his
attorney were so substantial that they undermined the adversarial process to the extent that the jury
verdict was unreliable," a burden he failed to meet. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 603, 605, 347 S.E.2d
at 862-63.
Defendant further claimed on appeal that the trial judge's gratuitous statements were prejudi-
cial, thus requiring a new trial, and that the court's denial of defense counsel's request to conduct a
re-cross-examination "violated his right to confront adversarial witnesses guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Id. at 599-600, 347 S.E.2d at 860.
The court of appeals rejected these arguments, holding that the judge's statements, although im-
proper, were not prejudicial to defendant, and that when the prosecutor's redirect examination in-
cluded no new matter, defense counsel was not entitled to a second cross-examination as a matter of
right. Id. at 600, 347 S.E.2d at 860.
23. Id. at 596, 347 S.E.2d at 858 (emphasis added). The State's reference to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-72.3, rather than § 14-27.3, was a typographical error. The court noted, however, that "refer-
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sufficient to overcome her resistance.
24
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment against defendant for second
degree sexual offense, holding that defendant's act of grabbing Noble's neck and
pushing her back down onto the bed constituted sufficient force to sustain a
conviction. 25 Moreover, the court held the evidence established that the act of
anal intercourse was against Noble's will, presumably because she was com-
pletely awake by that time and had tried to resist by sitting up prior to defend-
ant's initiation of anal intercourse.
26
As to defendant's conviction of second degree rape, however, the court held
that a fatal variance existed between the indictment and the proof presented at
trial.27 Unlike the act of anal intercourse, which was preceded by an act of
physical force28 that compelled the victim to acquiesce out of fear for her life,
defendant's "initiation of [vaginal] intercourse occurred while the prosecutrix
was asleep."'29 The court reasoned that the State had failed to prove the essen-
tial elements of force and lack of consent in accordance with its indictment be-
cause "penetration and the initiation of sexual intercourse was achieved while
the prosecutrix was asleep and unable to communicate an unwillingness to sub-
mit to the act."' 30 Although neither party raised the issue at trial, the court
concluded that the sleeping victim was "physically helpless" at the time of the
attack. 3 1 Intercourse with a physically helpless person is an offense under the
second subsection of the second degree rape statute,32 and neither force nor lack
of consent are elements of that offense.33 Therefore, the court indicated that
ence to an inapposite statute will not vitiate such an indictment." Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 596,
347 S.E.2d at 858.
24. Id. at 599, 347 S.E.2d at 860. For the distinction between second degree rape and second
degree sexual offense, see supra note 6.
25. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 599, 347 S.E.2d at 860. The one-half inch tear in the victim's
rectum as a result of the anal intercourse was further proof that defendant used force to accomplish
the sexual act. Id.
26. Id. Although the court did not clearly articulate its reasons for holding that the act of anal
intercourse was against Noble's will, it noted that "[a]fter defendant's use of force, the prosecutrix
was scared that defendant might injure her further, and thus offered no other resistance." Id.
27. Id. at 598, 347 S.E.2d at 859. In North Carolina "an indictment will not support a convic-
tion for a crime, all the elements of which are not accurately and clearly alleged in the indictment."
Id. at 597-98, 347 S.E.2d at 859 (citing State v. Perry, 291 N.C. 586, 231 S.E.2d 262 (1977)). The
purpose behind requiring conformity between the indictment and the proof is to avoid convicting the
defendant of a crime with which he was not charged. State v. Loudner, 77 N.C. App. 453, 453, 335
S.E.2d 78, 79 (1985).
28. The force required to sustain a conviction for rape or second degree sexual offense need not
be actual physical force. It can also be constructive. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
29. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 597, 347 S.E.2d at 859.
30. Id. at 598, 347 S.E.2d at 859.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see infra note 72 and accompanying text.
33. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 597, 347 S.E.2d at 859. The court noted that subsections (1)
and (2) of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3(a) are "two distinct and separate offenses of second degree
rape" within the statute. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 597, 347 S.E.2d at 859. The language of the
statute supports this distinction in that rape may be accomplished either by force and against the will
of the person, or by engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated, or physically helpless. See infra note 72 and accompanying text; see also State v.
Aiken, 73 N.C. App. 487, 498, 326 S.E.2d 919, 926 (1985) (emphasizing dual nature of second
degree rape statute).
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defendant would have been guilty under the statute's second subsection. None-
theless, the court held the State's failure to allege in its indictment that defend-
ant violated the second degree rape statute's second subsection rendered the
proof deficient to establish the offense. Consequently, the court arrested the
judgment.
34
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discre-
tionary review on November 18, 1986. 35 In its brief before the supreme court,
36
the State has contended that a sleeping person is not "physically helpless" within
the meaning of the second degree rape statute and that its use of the phrase "by
force and against the will" in the indictment was correct.37 Defendant's brief
concedes these points, but maintains that sex with a sleeping person can be
neither forcible, nor without her consent.
38
A number of cases have arisen in other jurisdictions dealing with the same
critical facts. Contrary to the Moorman court's holding, these jurisdictions have
held without exception that an act of sexual intercourse with a sleeping woman
constitutes sufficient force and is presumed to be against her will so as to support
a charge of rape. A group of British cases decided in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century squarely faced this issue. Two court of criminal appeal decisions,
Reg. v. Clarke39 and Reg. v. Barrow,4 0 revolved around the issue of consent.
Both cases involved a situation in which a married woman, awakened by a man
engaged in sexual intercourse with her, succumbed in the mistaken belief that
the man was her husband. The court quashed both defendants' convictions on
the grounds that the women's consent, although fraudulently obtained, negated
the charge of rape.41 Several years later, however, the same court criticized the
results in Clarke and Barrow and affirmed a defendant's conviction under similar
circumstances. In Reg. v. Young 4 2 a defendant engaged in an act of sexual inter-
course with a sleeping woman who then awoke. The court held that even if she
initially mistook defendant for her husband, "the prosecutrix did not consent
before, after, or at the time of the prisoner's having connection with her, that it
was against her will, and that the conduct of the prosecutrix did not lead the
prisoner in the belief that she did consent." 43 Similarly, in Reg. v. Mayers44 the
court noted that when defendant proceeded to have carnal knowledge of his
34. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 598, 347 S.E.2d at 859.
35. State v. Moorman, 318 N.C. 699, 350 S.E.2d 861 (1986). The court dismissed defendant's
appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question and denied his petition for discretionary re-
view. Id.
36. The North Carolina Supreme Court has not yet heard the case. Relevant points in the
State's and defendant's arguments before this court were taken from their respective briefs.
37. Brief for the State at 5-14, Moorman (No. 577PA86).
38. New Brief for the Defendant at 9-16.
39. 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 412 (1854).
40. 11 Cox Crim. Cas. 191 (1868).
41. Consent, however, must be to the act of sexual intercourse. See, eg., Reg. v. Flattery, 2
Q.B. Div. 410, 413, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 388, 391 (1877) (affirming defendant's rape conviction when
victim had consented not to act of sexual intercourse, but to medical operation).
42. 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 114 (1878).
43. Id. at 115.
44. 12 Cox Crim. Cas. 311 (1872).
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victim, "if she [is] asleep, she is incapable of consent, and therefore it would be a
rape."' 45 Thus, a presumption arose in the English cases that sexual intercourse
was against a woman's will and therefore rape if she was asleep at the time
penetration occurred.
American cases addressing the issue have adopted this view.46 In Common-
wealth v. Burke,47 a leading consent case involving a victim who was sexually
assaulted while unconscious from alcohol intoxication, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts noted that "it might be considered against the general
presumable will of a woman that a man should have unlawful connection with
her.... [U]nlawful and forcible connection with a woman in a state of uncon-
sciousness at the time.., is presumed to be without her consent, and is rape."
48
Whether the victim was unconscious from drink, as in Burke, or merely sleep-
ing, was not a controlling distinction. The common premise in either situation
was that when a woman was in no position to give consent to sexual intercourse,
her body was considered inviolate and consent would not be presumed. Cases
discussing the consent issue in the rape of a sleeping woman have emphasized
that "[i]t is easily understood, and universally recognized, that a person who is
unconscious by reason of intoxication, drugs, or sleep, is incapable of exercising
any judgment in any matter whatsoever."
49
Even though a presumption of rape has been held to exist when a man has
sex with a sleeping woman, the presumption is rebuttable. In Brown v. State 50
the Georgia Supreme Court noted:
Carnal knowledge of a woman while she is asleep and uncon-
scious of the act, and her body being penetrated before she awakens,
would be against her will and without her consent, and would consti-
tute the offense of rape, unless she had given the party charged with
45. Id. at 312.
46. See Territory v. Noguchi, 38 Haw. 350 (1949) (dictum); State v. Stroud, 362 Mo. 124, 240
S.W.2d 111 (1951); State v. Welch, 191 Mo. 179, 89 S.W. 945 (1905); State v. Shroyer, 104 Mo. 441,
16 S.W. 286 (1891) (dictum); In re Childers, 310 P.2d 776 (Okla. Crim. 1957); Payne v. State, 40
Tex. Crim. 202, 49 S.W. 604 (1899).
47. 105 Mass. 376 (1870).
48. Id. at 379. But see Pollard v. State, 2 Iowa 567 (1856) (holding that no such presumption
existed). In Pollard, defendant was accused of engaging in sexual intercourse with his twelve-year
old sister-in-law while she was asleep. The court reversed defendant's conviction, stating that
[t]he fact of the girl being asleep, if believed to be a fact, is a circumstance, it is true, but
one of very little or no moment, unless there were some manifestations of dissent, when she
awoke. It is just as consistent with willingness, as with unwillingness, and takes its charac-
ter from the subsequent events.
Id. at 570. The Pollard case, however, turned on the fact that the victim had offered no physical
resistance. Because most jurisdictions have, by and large, dispensed with the requirement of physical
resistance to show lack of consent, Pollard is somewhat of an anachronism. See infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
49. In re Childers, 310 P.2d 776, 778 (Okla. Crim. 1957); see also State v. Welch, 191 Mo. 179,
186, 89 S.W. 945, 947 (1905) ("if the prosecutrix in the case at bar was asleep at the time... she was
. . . incapable of giving assent"); State v. Shroyer, 104 Mo. 441, 446 (1891) (in dictum, stating there
could be "no consent while the intended victim slept"). Contrary to the language in Childers, how-
ever, a sleeping person arguably is not unconscious for the purposes of a rape charge. See infra text
accompanying notes 149-51; cf. Rahke v. State, 168 Ind. 615, 619, 81 N.E. 584, 585 (1907) (unlawful
carnal knowledge committed upon woman "mentally unconscious from drink or sleep... is rape").
50. 138 Ga. 814, 76 S.E. 379 (1912).
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the rape some reason to believe that she consented to the act.51
Thus, if a man and his wife had established a habit of this sort of sexual practice,
or if a man began an act of sexual intercourse with a sleeping woman who then
awakened and welcomed his advances, consent might be shown.
52
A cursory examination of the case law in other jurisdictions seems at first
glance to indicate that the element of force, the counterpart to lack of consent, is
not required when the victim is asleep. The Missouri Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, indicated that sexual intercourse with a sleeping woman is automatically
presumed to be rape because the act is without her consent.5 3 A closer analysis
of this type of case, however, reveals that force was indeed present. In the case
of a sleeping victim, courts outside North Carolina have held that the sexual act
itself becomes the force used to effectuate the crime of rape.54 Thus, a different
standard of force exists when the victim is asleep, a possibility the Moorman
court did not address. In State v. Dighera55 the Missouri Court of Appeals com-
mented that force and lack of consent are contemporaneous when the victim is
so disabled:
[S]exual intercourse upon a female induced into intoxication was
rape.... It was also rape.., for a male to impose sexual intercourse
upon a female who was then asleep... or too weak of intellect to know
the consequence of the act.... The rationale.., was that the disabil-
ity, in each case, vitiated capacity for consent, so that the mere physi-
cal entry attendant to penetration of the female organ was force
sufficient to constitute rape. That rationale treats force and consent as
correlatives. If there is force, there is no consent. If there is consent,
there is no force.
56
In the case of a sleeping person, force and lack of consent are also correlatives by
analogy: if there is no consent, there is force by implication.
57
Courts have accepted with unanimity the view that the act of sexual inter-
course constitutes sufficient force to support a charge of rape when the victim is
51. Id. see also Pollard v. State, 2 Iowa 567, 568 (1856) (consent or lack thereof to be deter-
mined from subsequent events).
52. In Pollard v. State, 2 Iowa 567 (1856), the court implied that if "[defendant] was in the act
of sexual intercourse with [prosecutrix]; that she was awakened by the pleasure of sexual enjoyment,
and suffered no pain," nor offered further resistance, that adultery or seduction would be more
appropriate than a charge of rape. Id. at 568, 570.
53. See State v. Stroud, 362 Mo. 124, 127, 240 S.W.2d 111, 112 (1951) ("Carnal connection
with a woman asleep is rape, because the act is without her consent."); State v. Welch, 191 Mo. 179,
187, 89 S.W. 945, 947 (1905) ("The general, if not universal, rule is that, if a man have connection
with a woman while she is asleep, he is guilty of rape, because the act is without her consent.");
Perkins, Non-Homicide Offenses Against the Person, 26 B.U.L. REV. 119, 177 (1946); Richardson,
Sexual Offenses Under the Proposed Missouri Criminal Code, 38 Mo. L. Rav. 371, 389 (1973); Com-
ment, Consent in the Criminal Law, 8 HARv. L. REv. 317, 321 (1895).
54. See cases cited infra note 58.
55. 617 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
56. Id. at 533 n.8.
57. One commentator has advocated the position that when there is no consent, there is force,
presumably regardless of the woman's mental faculties at the time of the sexual act. See Estrich,
Rape, 95 YALE L.L 1087, 1111 (1986); cf. infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing
relationship between force and consent when victim is awake).
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asleep. 58 In Rahke v. State59 the Indiana Supreme Court noted in dictum that
[f]orce is an essential element of the crime of rape. It is held that the
element of force need not be actual, but may be constructive or im-
plied. If the woman is mentally unconscious from drink or sleep.., so
that the act of unlawful carnal knowledge on the part of the man was
committed without her conscious and voluntary permission, the idea
of force is necessarily involved in the wrongful act itself. The act of
penetration and such carnal intercourse is rape.
60
The force in such cases is not constructive, 61 because the victim never "sub-
mits," nor is it actual force in the sense of physical violence that overcomes the
victim's resistance, for the very same reason. It is, however, actual physical
force in its most rudimentary sense: the sexual act itself. In North Carolina the
court of appeals previously held in State v. Aiken 62 that the force sufficient to
accomplish the act of intercourse constitutes sufficient force to support a convic-
tion for rape, when the victim of the rape is physically helpless. 63 It did not
comment on the applicability of such a rule when the victim was merely asleep,
although in State v. Raines" the same court declined to expand the "physical
force" doctrine65 to include the sexual act itself in situations in which the victim
was not physically helpless.
66
Moorman was a case of first impression in North Carolina. Prior to Moor-
man, no other rape case had considered whether an act of sexual intercourse
with a sleeping woman supplied the requisite elements of force and lack of con-
sent for a rape conviction. These two elements are firmly entrenched in North
Carolina common and statutory law. Older cases traditionally defined rape as
"the carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will," 67 a definition
58. See, eg., Territory v. Noguchi, 38 Haw. 350, 353 (1949) (no other force required to consti-
tute rape than that necessary to effect penetration); Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 380-81
(1870) ("such force as was necessary to accomplish the [sexual intercourse] was rape"); State v.
Welch, 191 Mo. 179, 188, 89 S.W. 945, 947 (1905) (quoting Burke, 105 Mass. at 380-81); In re
Childers, 310 P.2d 776, 777 (Okla. Crim. 1957) (force used may be "only such as is necessary to the
mere act of copulation"); Payne v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 202, 203-04, 49 S.W. 604, 605 (1899) ("force
used is only such force as may be used in the act of copulation").
59. 168 Ind. 615, 81 N.E. 584 (1907).
60. Id. at 619, 81 N.E. at 585.
61. For a discussion of constructive force, see infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
62. 73 N.C. App. 487, 326 S.E.2d 919 (1985). For a discussion of Aiken, see infra text accom-
panying notes 117-28.
63. Aiken, 73 N.C. App. at 499, 326 S.E.2d at 926; see also State v. Wortham, 80 N.C. App. 54,
58, 341 S.E.2d 76, 79 (1986) (in dictum, noting that "[f]orce sufficient to accomplish the act of
intercourse can constitute sufficient force to support a [rape] conviction"), rey'd in part, 318 N.C.
669, 351 S.E.2d 294 (1987).
64. 72 N.C. App. 300, 324 S.E.2d 279 (1985). For a discussion of Raines, see infra text accom-
panying notes 129-43.
65. Physical force in the context of rape is the same as actual force: the use of physical means
to achieve the sexual intercourse. Constructive force may also serve as force sufficient to support a
charge of rape. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
66. Raines, 72 N.C. App. at 303, 324 S.E.2d at 281.
67. State v. Johnston, 76 N.C. 209, 210 (1877); State v. Jim, 12 N.C. 142, 143 (1826); see also
State v. Dick, 6 N.C. 388, 388 (1818) (defendant "violently and against [prosecutrix'] will, feloni-
ously did ravish and carnally know [her].. ."). At common law rape was regarded as a felony, but it
was later changed to a misdemeanor under the statute of Westminster 1. Dick, 6 N.C. at 388. The
statute of Westminster 2, however, reconverted the offense to a felony. Id.
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that has endured. 68 Prior to its modem codification, the rape statute also in-
cluded these two prerequisites.
69
The current statutes divide the crime into two separate offenses. 70 First
degree rape differs from second degree rape in that it involves either a victim
under the age of thirteen years, the use of a deadly weapon, aiding or abetting
defendant in the commission of the crime, or infliction of serious bodily injury.
71
Alternatively,
[a] person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in
vaginal intercourse with another person
(1) By force and against the will of the other person; or
(2) Who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physi-
cally helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should rea-
sonably know the other person is mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated, or physically helpless.
72
The phrase "by force and against the will" in North Carolina's current rape
statutes73 means what it did at common law: "that the sexual act of vaginal
intercourse be forcible and without the consent of the woman."'74 Under the
second degree rape statute, unless the victim is mentally defective, mentally in-
68. E.g., State v. Pearce, 296 N.C. 281, 293, 250 S.E.2d 640, 649 (1979); State v. Yancey, 291
N.C. 656, 662, 231 S.E.2d 637, 641 (1977); State v. Armstrong, 287 N.C. 60, 64, 212 S.E.2d 894, 896
(1975), vacated in part, 428 U.S. 902 (1976); State v. Hines, 286 N.C. 377, 380, 211 S.E.2d 201, 203
(1975); State v. Cross, 284 N.C. 174, 176, 200 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1973); State v. Arnold, 284 N.C. 41, 50,
199 S.E.2d 423, 429 (1973); State v. Flippin, 280 N.C. 682, 684, 186 S.E.2d 917, 919 (1972); State v.
Primes, 275 N.C. 61, 67, 165 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1969); State v. Sneeden, 274 N.C. 498, 501, 164 S.E.2d
190, 193 (1968); State v. Crawford, 260 N.C. 548, 555, 133 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1963); State v. Primus,
226 N.C. 671, 673, 40 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1946); State v. Williams, 51 N.C. App. 397, 399, 276 S.E.2d
715, 717, disc. rev. denied, 303 N.C. 319, 281 S.E.2d 658 (1981); State v. Young, 16 N.C. App. 101,
106, 191 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1972).
69. Section 14-21, the precursor of sections 14-27 and -28 of the North Carolina General Stat-
utes, read: "Every person who is convicted of ravishing and carnally knowing any female of the age
of twelve years or more by force and against her will, or who is convicted of unlawfully and carnally
knowing and abusing any female under the age of twelve years, shall suffer death." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-21 (1943). In 1949 the statute was amended to include the proviso that the jury could
recommend a sentence of life imprisonment rather than the death penalty. Act of Mar. 11, 1949, ch.
299, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 262 (repealed by Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 683, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws
729). Today, the crime is no longer punishable by death. First degree rape is a Class B felony
punishable by life imprisonment, while second degree rape, a Class D felony, carries a maximum
sentence of 40 years. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-1.1(a)(2), (4), 14-27.2(b), -27.3(b) (1986).
70. In 1973 the general assembly provided for a division between first degree rape and second
degree rape. See Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1201, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323 (repealed and recodified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2, .3 (1986)).
71. N.C GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (1986). See State v. Corbett, 309 N.C. 382, 307 S.E.2d 139
(1983); State v. Barnette, 304 N.C. 447, 284 S.E.2d 298 (1981). Neither force nor lack of consent are
essential elements for the rape of a female under the age of 13 (formerly 12). See, eg., State v. Cobb,
295 N.C. 1, 243 S.E.2d 759 (1978) (force not required); State v. Cox, 280 N.C. 689, 187 S.E.2d 1
(1972) (lack of consent not required).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3(a) (1986). In 1979 the general assembly rewrote the rape and
sexual offense statutes to include a provision for mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, and
physically helpless victims. See Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 682, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 725 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2, -27.3 (1986)). For definitions of these types of persons, see infra notes
106-07, and text accompanying note 112.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2, -27.3 (1986). A conviction for first degree sexual offense
under § 14-27.4 or for second degree sexual offense under § 14-27.5 employs the same "by force and
against the will" language appearing in the rape statutes.
74. State v. Locklear, 304 N.C. 534, 539, 284 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1981); see also State v. Perry,
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capacitated, or physically helpless during the commission of the vaginal inter-
course, force and lack of consent must be shown.
75
It is well established in the law of rape that force as an element of the
offense need not be actual physical force. 76 North Carolina has long recognized
that the female's submission through fear or coercion serves as constructive
force sufficient to meet the "by force" requirement.77 In 1946 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court noted in State v. Johnson78 that "[flear, fright, or duress,
may take the place of force" and that the defendant's "threat[sl to kill [the vic-
tim] or do her great bodily harm" provided the requisite evidence of force to
carry the case to the jury.79 Recent cases have acknowledged the continuing
vitality of the constructive force doctrine.80
The North Carolina courts' acceptance of the constructive force doctrine
does not mean, however, that the doctrine has been liberally applied. The state's
rigid application of the force requirement in rape cases is illustrated most point-
edly by its adoption of the "general fear" theory. Under this theory, the fear
engendered by the defendant must be that which compels the victim to submit to
the sexual intercourse or sexual act. A generalized fear of the defendant does
not constitute sufficient constructive force.81 The general fear theory was most
recently propounded in State v. Alston.8 2 In Alston defendant and the complain-
ant, Brown, had been involved in a consensual sexual relationship occasionally
marked by violence on the part of the defendant.8 3 Brown testified that prior to
the alleged rape, she had wanted to end the relationship but did not do so for
fear of defendant's anger.84 One day defendant accosted Brown as she was
walking to school, eventually blocking her entrance to the school door. When
Brown refused to answer his questions, defendant grabbed her arm and released
it only upon her promise that she would walk with him.85 According to
291 N.C. 586, 591, 231 S.E.2d 262, 265-66 (1976) (1973 Act, dividing crime of rape into two sepa-
rate offenses, did not change common law definition of rape).
75. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
76. See, eg., 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 4 (1972); 75 C.J.S. Rape § 12 (1952); cases cited supra
note 58.
77. E.g., State v. Roberts, 293 N.C. 1, 13, 235 S.E.2d 203, 211 (1977); State v. Yancey, 291
N.C. 656, 663, 231 S.E.2d 637, 642 (1977); State v. Bums, 287 N.C. 102, 116,214 S.E.2d 56, 65, cerL
denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975); State v. Armstrong, 287 N.C. 60, 64, 212 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1975),
vacated in part, 428 U.S. 902 (1976); State v. Hines, 286 N.C. 377, 380, 211 S.E.2d 201, 203 (1975);
State v. Carthens, 284 N.C. 111, 115, 199 S.E.2d 456, 458, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1973); State v.
Thompson, 227 N.C. 19, 23, 40 S.E.2d 620, 623 (1946); State v. Primus, 226 N.C. 671, 674, 40
S.E.2d 113, 114 (1946); State v. Harvell, 45 N.C. App. 243, 248, 262 S.E.2d 850, 853, appeal dis-
missed, 300 N.C. 200, 269 S.E.2d 626 (1980).
78. 226 N.C. 671, 40 S.E.2d 113 (1946).
79. Id. at 674, 40 S.E.2d at 114.
80. E.g., State v. Strickland, 318 N.C. 653, 654, 351 S.E.2d 281, 282 (1987); State v. Alston, 310
N.C. 399, 408, 312 S.E.2d 470, 476 (1984); State v. Hosey, 79 N.C. App. 196, 200, 339 S.E.2d 414,
416, modified and aff'd, 318 N.C. 330, 348 S.E.2d 805 (1986); State v. Stanley, 74 N.C. App. 178,
183, 327 S.E.2d 902, 905, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C. 546, 335 S.E.2d 318 (1985).
81. State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 409, 312 S.E.2d 470, 476 (1984). This approach has drawn
sharp criticism. See Estrich, supra note 57, at 1107-12.
82. 310 N.C. 399, 312 S.E.2d 470 (1984).
83. Id. at 401, 312 S.E.2d at 471.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 401, 312 S.E.2d at 472.
1987] CRIMINAL LAW 1255
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Brown's testimony, defendant threatened to "fix" her face.86 She then accompa-
nied defendant to the house of defendant's friend.87 Once inside the house, de-
fendant engaged in sexual intercourse with Brown, although she told defendant
he could not have sex with her and she cried throughout the encounter.88
The North Carolina Supreme Court held the trial court erred when it de-
nied defendant's post-trial motion to dismiss.89 Although the supreme court
agreed with the court of appeals that the State's evidence was sufficient to show
the intercourse was against Brown's will,90 it held that
there was no substantial evidence that threats or force by the defendant
... were sufficiently related to sexual conduct to cause Brown to be-
lieve that she had to submit to sexual intercourse with him or suffer
harm. Although Brown's general fear of the defendant may have been
justified by his conduct on prior occasions, absent evidence that the
defendant used force or threats to overcome the will of the victim to
resist the sexual intercourse alleged to have been rape, such general fear
was not sufficient to show that the defendant used the force required to
support a conviction of rape.91
The court's reluctance to find constructive force in Alston may have been
grounded in the consensual, adult sexual relationship that had existed between
the parties prior to the alleged rape. Requiring that the acts of force or threats
of force directly trigger submission to the sexual act presumably would act as a
safeguard to protect defendants from improper allegations of rape when the par-
ties are involved in a consensual sexual relationship.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, has expanded the "general
fear" theory to include nonconsensual sexual relationships. In State v. Lester
92
defendant was charged with the second degree rape of his fifteen-year-old
daughter. She had submitted to her father on several occasions because, based
on prior incidents of violence, she feared his retribution if she did not acqui-
esce.93 The court of appeals found sufficient evidence to show the acts of sexual
intercourse between defendant and his daughter were against her will.94 Relying
on Alston, however, the court noted that there was "no evidence... that defend-
ant used either actual or constructive force to accomplish the acts .... [T]he
victim's fear of defendant, however justified by his previous conduct, is insuffi-
cient to show that defendant forcibly raped his daughter .... 95 Although the
victim in Lester was the defendant's daughter and, unlike the victim in Alston,
86. Id. at 402, 312 S.E.2d at 472.
87. Brown later testified that she did not run away because there was "nowhere to go." Id.
88. Id. at 403, 312 S.E.2d at 472-73.
89. Id. at 409-10, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
90. Id. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 475.
91. Id. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
92. 70 N.C. App. 757, 321 S.E.2d 166 (1984), aff'd, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985).
93. Prior to the alleged rapes, defendant had beaten his wife, his girlfriend, and his son. On one
occasion he had pointed a gun at his children. Id. at 758-59, 321 S.E.2d at 167.
94. Id. at 761, 321 S.E.2d at 168.
95. Id.
1256 [Vol. 65
"under defendant's constant and continuing control and dominion," 96 this dis-
tinction was not enough to persuade the court to rule differently. Read together,
Alston and Lester illustrate the courts' conservative approach toward the force
requirement and foreshadow the result in Moorman.
Alston and Lester also make clear that force and lack of consent are not
always correlative, in the sense that an act of sexual intercourse may be against a
person's will, yet, under certain circumstances, not forcible. 97 On the other
hand, Alston's "general fear" doctrine requires that a defendant's use of actual
or constructive force "overcome the will of the victim to resist the sexual inter-
course."9 8 Thus, although force necessarily implies lack of consent, the reverse
is not always true.99
Compared to the standard of force required to sustain a rape conviction, the
"against the will" requirement is generally more flexible, although it does not
obviate the necessity of an independent showing of force. One illustration is the
courts' refusal to draw a distinction between the words "against the will" and
"without consent."' 1° A defendant accused of engaging in a sexual act with a
woman "by force and against her will" might emphasize the woman's failure to
object verbally or resist physically, and thus argue that the act, although done
without her consent, was not demonstrably against her will. Such an argument
is not compelling.10 1 North Carolina has long acknowledged that" 'the phrases
"against the will of the female" and "without her consent" mean the same thing.
Any attempted distinction would be meaningless and could only confuse a jury
if it were attempted.' "102 The rationale is that submission is not synonymous
with consent. In North Carolina evidence of physical resistance is not required
to prove lack of consent.' 03 Although consent is a complete defense to a charge
96. Id. at 762, 321 S.E.2d at 169 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
97. Professor Estrich has criticized the result in Aiston and Lester. Discussing the paradox in
the law of rape-that sex can be without a woman's consent, yet involve no force-she noted:
To say that there is no "force" in such a situation is to create a gulf between power
and force, and to define the latter solely in schoolboy terms....
That the law prohibiting forced sex understands force in such narrow terms is frus-
trating enough for its women victims. Worse, however, is the fact that the conclusion that
no force is present may emerge as a judgment not that the man did not act unreasonably,
but as a judgment that the woman victim did.
Estrich, supra note 57, at 1112.
98. Alston, 310 N.C. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
99. In the case of a sleeping victim, however, the relationship between force and consent
changes, so that lack of consent does imply force. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
100. Other jurisdictions, in determining whether an act of sexual intercourse with a sleeping
woman can constitute forcible rape, have agreed that the phrases "without consent" and "against the
will" are synonymous. See, eg., Brown v. State, 138 Ga. 814, 814, 76 S.E. 379, 379 (1912); Territory
v. Noguchi, 38 Haw. 350, 353 (1949); Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 377 (1870); State v.
Welch, 191 Mo. 179, 186, 89 S.W. 945, 947 (1905); Payne v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 202, 203-04, 49
S.W. 604, 605 (1899).
101. See Perkins, supra note 53, at 177.
102. State v. Carter, 265 N.C. 626, 630, 144 S.E.2d 826, 829 (1965) (quoting Wilson v. State, 49
Del. 37, 57-58, 109 A.2d 381, 392 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955)).
103. Alston, 310 N.C. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 475 (citing State v. Hall, 293 N.C. 559, 563, 238
S.E.2d 473, 476 (1977)). North Carolina follows the majority rule. At least one jurisdiction, how-
ever, requires that the victim" 'resist to the utmost with the most vehement exercise of every physi-
cal means or faculty naturally within her power to prevent carnal knowledge.'" Prokop v. State,
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of rape, it is void when induced by fear of bodily harm or other such violence,
either through threats of violence or actual physical force. 1°4
A conviction for second degree rape does not require proof of force and
lack of consent when the defendant engages in sexual intercourse105 with a men-
tally defective, 10 6 mentally incapacitated,1 07 or physically helpless 10 8 person.
Mentally defective and mentally incapacitated persons receive special protection
under the statute because they may lack the requisite mental capacity to oppose
the sexual intercourse or some other sexual act.109 Accordingly, a defendant
may not claim that a person consented to sex when that person was "substan-
tially incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct," of resisting the
sexual act, or of communicating an unwillingness to submit to such an act. 110
Force and lack of consent in this situation are presumed. As a result, the ele-
ments are seldom, if ever, disputed in these cases.111
A "physically helpless" person under both the rape and sex offense statutes
is defined as "(i) a victim who is unconscious; or (ii) a victim who is physically
unable to resist an act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act or communicate
unwillingness to submit to an act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act."1 12 The
second subsection of the second degree rape statute thus protects the physically
148 Neb. 582, 587, 28 N.W.2d 200, 203 (1947) (quoting Casio v. State, 147 Neb. 1075, 1078-79, 25
N.W.2d 897, 900 (1947)); cf. State v. Schmear, 28 Wis. 2d 126, 130, 135 N.W.2d 842, 846 (1965)
("utmost resistance" required to show lack of consent, but "the law does not require the useless or
the impossible"). Other courts have replaced the "utmost resistance" standard with the "reasonable
resistance" standard. See generally Estrich, supra note 57, at 1131 (criticizing the requirement of
any form of resistance and suggesting that lack of consent alone is sufficient).
104. EFg., State v. Locklear, 304 N.C. 534, 540, 284 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1981); State v. Hall, 293
N.C. 559, 563, 238 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1977); State v. Primes, 275 N.C. 61, 67, 165 S.E.2d 225, 229
(1969); State v. Carter, 265 N.C. 626, 631, 144 S.E.2d 826, 829 (1965); State v. Britt, 80 N.C. App.
147, 148, 341 S.E.2d 51, 51, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 337, 346 S.E.2d 141 (1986); State v. Ricks, 34
N.C. App. 734, 735, 239 S.E.2d 602, 603, cert. denied, 294 N.C. 363, 242 S.E.2d 633 (1977). Con-
sent is also nullified when given by a person under the age of 13. See supra note 71.
105. Likewise, neither force nor lack of consent are required elements of proof for a second
degree sexual offense when a defendant engages in a sexual act-other than vaginal intercourse-
with a mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless person. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-27.5 (1986).
106. "Mentally defective" as it is used within the rape and sexual offense statutes means
(i) a victim who suffers from mental retardation, or (ii) a victim who suffers from a mental
disorder, either of which temporarily or permanently renders the victim substantially inca-
pable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or of resisting the act of vaginal
intercourse or a sexual act, or of communicating unwillingness to submit to the act of
vaginal intercourse or a sexual act.
Id. § 14-27.1(1).
107. A "mentally incapacitated" person is defined under the statute as "a victim who due to any
act committed upon the victim is rendered substantially incapable of either appraising the nature of
his or her conduct, or resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act." Id. § 14-27.1(2).
108. See infra text accompanying note 112.
109. See supra notes 106-07.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1 (1986).
111. See, eg., State v. Clontz, 51 N.C. App. 639, 277 S.E.2d 580 (1981), aff'd, 305 N.C. 116, 286
S.E.2d 793 (1982). In Clontz the defendant was charged with the second degree rape of a 20-year-
old, mentally retarded woman who also was afflicted with cerebral palsy. Id. at 639, 277 S.E.2d at
580. Defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds that the trial judge had erred in refusing to
order the prosecuting witness to undergo a psychiatric examination. Id. The court did not consider
whether force or lack of consent was established.
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(3) (1986).
1258 [Vol. 65
disabled as well as the mentally disabled.' 13 The few North Carolina cases
brought under the "physically helpless" portion of the statute have involved per-
sons who were alleged to be physically unable to resist or to convey unwilling-
ness because of physical illness, 114 congenital disease,115 or alcoholic
intoxication. l
1 6
In two recent decisions, the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered
the issues of force and consent in rape cases in which the victim was alleged to
be physically helpless. In Aiken defendant was convicted of two counts of sec-
ond degree rape. Both he and the victim were students at Catawba College.
117
During a springtime event at which many students drank beer to the point of
intoxication, the victim "passed out" and eventually had to be carried back to
her tent by her friends, who then left her to go to a bonfire.II s Evidence tended
to show that shortly thereafter defendant entered the tent and had sexual inter-
course twice with his unresponsive victim." 9 The victim had remained uncon-
scious during both encounters and was not aware of defendant's conduct until
her friends later informed her of what had transpired. 120 Defendant confessed
to engaging in two acts of sexual intercourse with the victim, but claimed that
she had consented both times. 12 1 The jury convicted defendant on both counts
of second degree rape, and he appealed. Defendant argued the trial court erred
in instructing the jury that it could find defendant guilty "if it found, among
other facts, that the victim was 'drunk and, as a result, was so physically unable
to resist an act of vaginal intercourse as to be physically helpless.' "122 Defend-
ant argued that the jury also should have considered whether he had used force
against the victim, relying on the language in State v. Johnston 123 that "'[n]ape
is the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.' "124
The court of appeals held no error, implying that an independent showing
of force was not required when the victim was physically helpless:
G.S. 14-27.3 contemplates that the crime of second degree rape can
occur if there is vaginal intercourse by the use of force or with one who
113. A physically helpless victim might also be mentally disabled. See, eg., State v. Clontz, 51
N.C. App. 639, 639, 277 S.E.2d 580, 580 (1981) (indictment charged defendant with second degree
rape of "mentally defective, mentally incapacitated and physically helpless" person), aff'd, 305 N.C.
116, 286 S.E.2d 793 (1982).
114. See State v. Raines, 72 N.C. App. 300, 301, 324 S.E.2d 279, 280 (1985) (hospital patient
suffering from migraine headaches, nausea, and seizures); see infra text accompanying notes 129-43.
115. See State v. Joines, 66 N.C. App. 459, 311 S.E.2d 49 (multiple sclerosis), rev'd on other
grounds, 311 N.C. 405, 319 S.E.2d 282 (1984); State v. Clontz, 51 N.C. App. 639, 277 S.E.2d 580
(cerebral palsy), aff'd, 305 N.C. 116, 286 S.E.2d 793 (1982).
116. See State v. Aiken, 73 N.C. App. 487, 490, 326 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1985); see infra text accom-
panying notes 117-128.
117. Although defendant and the victim knew each other casually, they were not dating. Aiken,




121. Id. at 491, 326 S.E.2d at 922.
122. Id. at 498, 326 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting the trial court's instruction to the jury).
123. 76 N.C. 209 (1877).
124. Aiken, 73 N.C. App. at 498, 326 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Johnston, 76 N.C. at 210).
12591987] CRIMINAL LAW
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
is, among other things, physically helpless.... [The statute] also does
not require that defendant be the one who made the victim mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless.
1 25
At the same time, the court implied that the elements of force and lack of con-
sent were established automatically when a person engaged in an act of sexual
intercourse with a physically helpless victim. 1 26 The court noted that "even at
common law.., an unconscious or insensibly drunk victim could not consent to
intercourse" and furthermore "[t]he physical act of vaginal intercourse with the
victim while she is physically helpless is sufficient 'force' for the purpose of sec-
ond degree rape under G.S. 14-27.3."127 As in those situations involving an act
of sexual intercourse with a mentally defective or mentally incapacitated individ-
ual, a presumption arises in the case of a physically helpless person that the act
was accomplished by force and against the person's will.
128
In another recent decision, the court of appeals confronted a question sig-
nificant to the outcome in Moorman: under what circumstances does the sexual
act itself constitute sufficient "force" for a charge of second degree rape? In
Raines the court of appeals suggested that when the victim in an alleged rape is
not physically helpless within the meaning of the statute, the act of sexual inter-
course does not supply the necessary force to sustain a conviction.1 29 The prose-
cuting witness in Raines was a patient at Memorial Mission Hospital in
Asheville, North Carolina. She had been admitted to the hospital's intensive
care unit with complaints of migraine headaches, extreme nausea, and
seizures. 130 During the time of the alleged rape, the patient was connected to
intravenous (I.V.) and heart monitoring equipment.1 3 1 She testified that twice
during the evening, defendant, a charge nurse at the hospital, put something in
her I.V., causing a "burning sensation." 132 After each incident defendant placed
his hand in her vagina and then tried to rape her, succeeding in the second
attempt.133
The State's indictment charged defendant with second degree rape and sec-
ond degree sexual offense, and the case was submitted to the jury on the alterna-
tive theories that he committed the offenses (1) "by force and against her will";
or (2) while she was "physically helpless." The jury acquitted defendant on the
rape charge but convicted him of a second degree sexual offense "by force and
against [the] will" of the victim.
134
It is notable that the Raines jury found in a special verdict that the com-
plainant was not physically helpless.135 The complainant, a hospital patient in
125. Id. at 498-99, 326 S.E.2d at 926.
126. Id. at 499, 326 S.E.2d at 926.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Raines, 72 N.C. App. at 304-05, 324 S.E.2d at 282.




134. Id. at 300, 324 S.E.2d at 280.
135. Id. at 305, 324 S.E.2d at 282. The Raines opinion did not elaborate on the jury's findings.
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the intensive care unit, was conscious at the time of the incidents, even though
she was extremely weakened physically and dependent on an I.V. and a heart
monitor. The rape and sex offense statutes make clear, however, that a physi-
cally helpless person need not be unconscious to fall within their coverage.
136
The finding in Raines suggests that North Carolina courts apply a very stringent
standard in determining whether a person is physically unable to resist or con-
vey lack of consent to a sexual act.
137
On appeal defendant contended that the State had failed to show sufficient
evidence of actual or constructive force, and requested a reversal of his convic-
tion for second degree sexual offense. 138 Because the complainant was not
deemed physically helpless, a separate showing of force was required. The court
of appeals agreed with defendant's argument, holding that
[p]hysicalforce, as that phrase is generally understood in sexual offense
and kindred cases, was absent in this case. And, we decline to accept
the State's invitation to expand the "physical force" doctrine and bring
within its ambit the conduct-the physical touching-that constitutes
the "sexual act" itself in this case .... [W]e reject the argument set
forth in the State's brief that. . . "the assailant had used the necessary
force to complete the act before his victim had an opportunity to resist
or even to become frightened... [and] should not be heard to say that
because he deliberately surprised his victim and attacked her com-
pletely without warning" that he is not guilty.
139
The court also rejected the State's constructive force' 4° argument, noting that
the State in its brief had avoided characterizing the case as one involving con-
structive force. 14 1 Holding that there was no evidence of any such force "which
could reasonably and understandably generate fear in the prosecuting witness,"
nor any evidence of actual physical force, 142 the court reversed defendant's
conviction. 143
Although Aiken and Raines are peripheral to the issue in Moorman, the
decisions reflect the legal milieu in which Moorman was decided. These deci-
sions also indicate the difficulty courts have had with the force requirement in
situations not falling neatly within the traditional rape pattern. They differ sig-
nificantly from Moorman, however, in that physical helplessness was not ques-
tioned on appeal. In Aiken the victim was unconscious from alcohol
intoxication, rendering her physically helpless under the statute. 144 On the
other hand, the jury in Raines found that the victim, who was awake at the time
136. See supra text accompanying note 112.
137. See infra text accompanying note 175.
138. Raines, 72 N.C. App. at 302, 324 S.E.2d at 281.
139. Id. at 303, 324 S.E.2d at 281.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
141. Raines, 72 N.C. App. at 304, 324 S.E.2d at 282.
142. Id. at 305, 324 S.E.2d at 283.
143. Id. Defendant was later tried and convicted of two violations under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
27.7 (1986) for engaging in sexual acts "with a person over whom his employer had custody." See
State v. Raines, 81 N.C. App. 299, 301-03, 344 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1986). Consent is not a defense to a
charge under this statute.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
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of the attack and apparently able to resist physically, was not physically help-
less. 145 Moorman dealt instead with the unusual case of a sleeping victim.
14 6
Normal sleep is a state between consciousness and unconsciousness. It is
not the same as drugged or intoxicated sleep in which the person is so incapaci-
tated that he or she cannot be revived, nor is it the type of unconsciousness
produced by physical injury. Conversely, sleep is temporarily disabling, initially
preventing a person from resisting physically or conveying a lack of consent as
she might if she were fully awake. The phenomenon of sleep is unique because
the sleeping person may, unlike the victim in Aiken, instantly awaken and regain
the faculties of a fully conscious person. In this regard, the sleeping person does
not automatically fall within the "physically helpless" provision of the second
degree rape statute, contrary to the court of appeals' holding in Moorman.
In its brief before the North Carolina Supreme Court, the State has
presented a persuasive argument that normal sleep does not constitute physical
helplessness under the statute. It first noted that "[tihe statute never utilizes the
word 'sleep.' "147 The State next argued that as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion a sleeping person was not intended to be included within the statute's
"physically helpless" provision. 148 The language in the original bill, part of
which later became codified in the second degree rape statute, defined a physi-
cally helpless victim as "(1) a victim who is unconscious; or (2) a victim who
does not consent to... [certain acts] ... or communicate unwillingness to ...
[certain acts]." ' 149 The House Judiciary Committee then replaced this language
with "physically unable to resist.., or communicate unwillingness," the lan-
guage of the present statute.1 50 From this history the State has concluded that
adoption of the current language "narrows the statutory scope and removes a
merely sleeping victim from this statutory provision, because sleep alone would
not render a person physically unable to consent or communicate unwilling-
ness." 15 1 Defendant's brief is in agreement, noting that the general assembly, if
it had intended to include sleep within the statute, easily could have done so.
152
Assuming the supreme court accepts the State's argument that a sleeping
person is not physically helpless, the question of whether force and lack of con-
sent were established in Moorman remains.1 53 The State admitted that "[t]he
145. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
146. Normal sleep should be distinguished from the type of sleep induced by heavy alcohol or
drug ingestion. In the latter situation in which the victim is unresponsive, she is unconscious and
therefore physically helpless. See Brief for the State at 14, Moorman (No. 577PA86) (citing other
jurisdictions in which ordinary sleep is excluded from physically helpless provision of statute).
147. Id. at 12.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Minutes of the House Judiciary III Committee, 1979 Session).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. New Brief for the Defendant at 10, Moorman (No. 577PA86).
153. The court of appeals' holding in Moorman that a sleeping person is physically helpless for
the purpose of a charge under the second degree rape statute precluded consideration of the elements
of force and consent, even though the court summarily held that force and lack of consent cannot be
proven when the victim is asleep. See supra text accompanying note 30. The supreme court's exami-
nation of these issues accordingly will be ab initio.
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actual force necessary to achieve vaginal penetration of a sleeping victim is mini-
mal at best,"'but argued that the requisite amount of force need only be suffi-
cient to overcome the resistance of the victim. 154 Thus, according to the State,
defendant's act of "pushing up the victim's dress, removing her panties and
physical [sic] penetrating her vagina" constituted sufficient force to overcome
the sleeping victim's resistance. 15 5 The State has also argued on appeal that
there was no consent because it was impossible for the sleeping victim to convey
willingness to submit to the sexual intercourse; moreover, she tried to resist
"[f]rom the instant she could comprehend her plight."'
15 6
Defendant, in his brief before the supreme court, has contended that neither
force nor lack of consent is established when an act of sexual intercourse is per-
formed on a sleeping person. Constructive force, according to defendant, is not
present when one engages in sexual intercourse with a sleeping person because
the person, by virtue of sleep, cannot submit to her attacker out of fear engen-
dered by the-attacker's threats. 157 Moreover, it is unlikely that a rapist would
have to threaten his victim to obtain her acquiescence, because a sleeping person
offers no resistance. Actual force was not established either, defendant has ar-
gued, because an act of sexual intercourse alone is insufficient to satisfy the force
requirement.158 Rejecting the State's theory that Moorman's act of lifting up
Noble's dress, removing her panties, and achieving penile penetration met the
force requirement, defendant claims that
[flar from constituting force, these actions are necessary prerequisites
to consensual sexual activity. Penetration is the act of intercourse it-
self, and not an act of violence. To hold that such action constitutes
"force" would be to hold that all sexual intercourse is violent and
would eradicate a fundamental element of the rape statute.
159
Defendant has also challenged the State's presumption that an act of sexual
intercourse with a sleeping woman is without her consent. Relying on cases in
154. Brief for the State at 20, Moorman (No. 577PA86).
155. Id. The State has made the additional argument that defendant's act of pushing the prose-
cutrix back down on the bed after penetration met the force requirement. The State has analogized
its case to State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 333 S.E.2d 245 (1985), a first degree rape case resulting
in serious bodily injury, in which defendant argued that injury after the fact of nonconsensual inter-
course could not be said to overcome the victim's resistance. The supreme court held that postcoitus
injury was nonetheless part of a "'series of incidents forming one continuous transaction between
the rape or sexual offense and the infliction [on the victim] of the serious personal injury.'" Brief for
the State at 21, Moorman (No. 577PA86) (quoting Blackstock, 314 N.C. at 242, 333 S.E.2d at 252).
According to the State, the timing of the push under the "continuous transaction" test thus becomes
irrelevant. The analogy, however, is misplaced. Blackstock was a first degree rape case, and, as
defendant in Moorman correctly noted, "the first degree rape statute was amended specifically to
delete the requirement that the serious bodily injury be inflicted in the effort to achieve intercourse.
No such amendment has been made to the second degree rape statute." New Brief for the Defend-
ant at 13-14, Moorman (No. 577PA86). The requirement that the force be used to "achieve inter-
course, not to prevent its interruption" therefore remains under the second degree rape statute. Id.
at 12 (emphasis in original) (citing State v. Hall, 293 N.C. 559, 238 S.E.2d 473 (1977); State v.
Smith, 45 N.C. App. 501, 263 S.E.2d 371 (1980)); but see infra text accompanying notes 171-72
(arguing that force need not be used to achieve intercourse when victim is asleep).
156. Brief for the State at 21, Moorman (No. 577PA86).
157. New Brief for the Defendant at 10-11, Moorman (No. 577PA86).
158. Id. at 11-12.
159. Id. at 12.
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which the alleged victims were fully awake, defendant maintained that the vic-
tim's "lack of consent must be communicated to the defendant" and that "the
lack of consent issue will not be determined by the unannounced subjective feel-
ings of the prosecutrix."' 16° Although Noble was asleep when initiation of the
sexual intercourse occurred, defendant relied on her failure to verbally express
her lack of consent either before or during the intercourse. 161 Also, defendant
stressed that Noble's subsequent attempt to sit up during the act was not suffi-
cient to convey lack of consent, because she was required to convey such unwill-
ingness prior to the act. Thus, if she acted "in such a way that it [appeared] that
she [did] not disapprove of intercourse," her lack of consent after the fact of
penetration would have been unavailing.
162
Curiously, neither the State nor defendant, in either the appellate opinion
or argument prepared for the supreme court, acknowledged the wealth of cases
in other courts holding that sexual intercourse with a sleeping victim is pre-
sumed to be forcible and without her consent.163 In Moorman the court of ap-
peals held that because the victim "was asleep and unable to communicate an
unwillingness to submit to the act," she could not show the act was against her
will.164 Such logic contradicts time-honored precedent in other jurisdictions
and, if taken to its extreme, leads to the conclusion that a man is entitled to have
sexual intercourse with a sleeping woman because she did not say he could
not. 165
Defendant, moreover, cannot reasonably claim that he believed the victim
consented. As other courts have indicated, a presumption exists in the case of a
sleeping woman that an act of sexual intercourse is against her will. 166 The
evidence in Moorman does not rebut this presumption: defendant and the victim
were barely acquainted and were not involved in the type of relationship which
might entitle him to believe that having sex with her while she was asleep was
acceptable. Moreover, defendant demonstrated that he knew the act was against
the victim's will when, in his effort to continue the ongoing sexual intercourse,
he forced her back down on the bed when she awoke and tried to resist.
167
Moorman was clearly not a situation in which the victim gave defendant tacit
license to engage in sexual intercourse with her.
160. Id. at 14 (citing State v. Ricks, 34 N.C. App. 734, 239 S.E.2d 602 (1977), cert. denied, 294
N.C. 363, 242 S.E.2d 633 (1978)).
161. Id. at 15.
162. Id. at 14. Defendant argued that because Noble dreamed she was having sexual intercourse
and thus "appeared to be cooperating," he was entitled to believe she consented to the intercourse.
Id. at 15.
163. See cases cited supra note 58.
164. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 598, 347 S.E.2d at 859.
165. Professor Estrich, although not addressing the issue of the rape of a sleeping woman, noted
that much of the confusion over consent in rape cases stems from the male's traditional dominance
over the female: "Rape is unique... in the definition which has been accorded to consent. That
definition makes all too plain that the purpose of the consent rule is not to protect female autonomy
and freedom of choice, but to assure men the broadest sexual access to women." Estrich, supra note
57, at 1122.
166. See cases cited supra note 46.
167. Moorman, 82 N.C. App. at 597, 347 S.E.2d at 859.
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The relationship between force and consent changes substantially when the
victim is asleep. In Alston and Lester, the two cases involving the "general fear"
theory, 16 8 the North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals noted that
lack of consent alone, without a showing of force directly used to overcome the
will of the victim, could not sustain a charge of rape.169 What both courts failed
to realize, however, is that sleep "vitiate[s] capacity for consent, so that the mere
physical entry attendant to penetration of the female organ [is] force sufficient to
constitute rape."' 170 The Moorman court's requirement that the force used to
constitute rape be "actual or constructive force used to achieve or accomplish
the sexual intercourse"' 17 1 is simply inapplicable in a situation in which a victim
is asleep and not in a position to resist or to convey unwillingness to submit to
the act. To hold otherwise would rob women of their autonomy in sexual rela-
tions and frustrate the supposed goal of rape laws: to protect the "woman's
discretion by proscribing coitus contrary to her wishes."'
172
The Raines case, although somewhat contrary to the argument supporting
the existence of force/lack of consent in these cases, is readily distinguishable
from Moorman in the level of resistance necessary to meet the "against the will"
requirement. In Raines the complainant was awake at the time of the incident
and allegedly able to offer some measure of resistance, however weak. Accord-
ingly, the court required some showing of force as proof that she did not tacitly
allow the rape to occur.' 73 In Moorman the victim, not being awake at the time
of initial penetration, did not have a similar opportunity to oppose the sexual
intercourse. Defendant, moreover, could not reasonably assume that his victim
acquiesced while she slept.' 74 For these reasons, the traditional standard of
force should be relaxed and the sexual act itself should assume all the force that
the law requires to sustain a rape conviction.
Including sleeping persons under the rubric of "physically helpless"
presents internal problems of classification. The intoxicated victim, the coma-
tose patient, and the paralytic obviously meet the requirements of physically
helpless persons. But what of the sleeper whose consciousness fluctuates back
and forth from light slumber to the brink of wakefulness? Might not courts,
168. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
170. State v. Dighera, 617 S.W.2d 524, 533 n.8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
171. Moorman, 82 N.C App. at 598, 347 S.E.2d at 859.
172. Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the
Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 71 (1952). In situations in which the victim is awake, however,
"the law does not protect the woman from 'coitus contrary to her wishes' when there is no 'force.'"
Estrich, supra note 57, at 1122 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note 91.
173. Some jurisdictions have held that force is present in the sexual act itself when the act is
accomplished through surprise. In State v. Atkins, 292 S.W. 422, 426 (Mo. 1926), defendant, an eye
specialist, had engaged in sexual intercourse with his patient, who believed he was fitting her with
bifocals. The Missouri Supreme Court held that
[it is] rape for a man to have improper sexual connection with a woman by accomplishing
penetration through surprise, when she is awake, but utterly unaware of his intention in
that regard .... [T]he force merely incident to penetration should be deemed sufficient
force within the meaning of [the] rape statute.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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strictly construing the definition of physically helpless persons, hold that this
person is not "physically unable to resist an act of vaginal intercourse" or com-
municate an unwillingness to submit to such an act?
175
The undefinable nature of sleep makes it an unruly candidate for inclusion
under the "physically helpless" provision of the second degree rape statute.
Therefore, the North Carolina General Assembly should consider creating a
separate category for sleeping victims as another exception to the force/consent
requirement, along with mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, and physi-
cally helpless victims. Until the general assembly acts, courts should accept the
allegation "by force and against the will" as a proper part of the rape indict-
ment. To hold that force and lack of consent cannot by their nature be proved
when the victim is asleep frustrates the purpose of the current rape statutes and
perpetuates the notion that women are sexual chattels.
RENtE MADELEINE HOM
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(3) (1986). For pertinent statutory language, see supra text ac-
companying note 112.
ADDENDUM
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision in Moorran on July
28, 1987. State v. Moorman, 358 S.E.2d 502 (1987). The supreme court held, contrary to the appel-
late court decision arresting judgment on defendant's second-degree rape conviction, that there was
no fatal variance between the State's indictment alleging that defendant carnally knew the victim "by
force and against her will," and evidence that defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the
victim while she was asleep. Although the State might have elected to proceed under the "physically
helpless" provision of the second-degree rape statute, the court noted, force and lack of consent also
were implied when defendant initiated sexual intercourse with a sleeping victim, thus supporting an
indictment under the "force and lack of consent" provision of the statute.
The court, however, has granted defendant a new trial on the ground that defendant was denied
his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Justice Meyer concurred as to the
reversal of the court of appeals decision, but dissented as to the court's remand, noting that he would
have affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the trial was unaffected by any deficiencies on the part
of the defendant's counsel.
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